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York: Basic Books, 1970. Pp. 652. $15.00.
The sociology of law, as these two substantial books demonstrate,
is by now an important and well-established enterprise. The slicer
quantity of material in these readers testifies to the range of issues and
concerns that have emerged in recent years. The books themselves
are both very solid collections, and they cover the field comprehensive-
ly and intelligently.
At the same time, there are things going on in American society
that I find difficult to relate to the materials in these collections of
readings. There is a sense of crisis in American justice. The criminal
courts have become racial and political battlegrounds. Resistance and
rebellion in the jails and prisons have become commonplace. The
systematic suspension of due process in the arrests of thousands of
anti-war demonstrators is applauded at the highest levels of govern-
ment. Names like George Jackson, Angela Davis, and Bobby Scale
suggest the seriousness and urgency of the need to examine the struc-
tures of American justice at their root. I am not sure that the contem-
porary sociology of law can tell us much about these things or provide
the framework in which that kind of examination could take place.
Not everyone will agree that the sociology of law should be able
to throw light on these questions. It is sometimes held that the goal
of social science should be to develop concepts and generalizations
t Lecturer in Sociology, Yale University. B.A. 1965, Roosevelt University; M.A. 1967,
University of California (Berkeley).
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that, like those of the physical sciences, are universal, or nearly so, in
their applicability. Friedman and Macaulay suggest, for example, that
The ideal for the social sciences is the situation of the physical
sciences; what is true of falling bodies in New York today is true
of them in Brisbane tomorrow and Nairobi yesterday. Needless
to say, the social sciences are years away from the level of "sci-
ence" that physics and biochemistry have achieved.'
But social science concepts that are applicable to both Nairobi and
New York may serve mainly to obscure whatever is most distinct and
humanly important about each. There may be a limited case for
spending time and effort on issues like "the relation between law and
other social subsystems" or "the impact of law on society,"2 though
I am inclined to be skeptical. At any rate, to concentrate on that kind
of issue while ignoring more substantive social analysis would be
merely irresponsible. Friedman and Macaulay also suggest that the
study of law and legal institutions needs to become both more empiri-
cal and more "relevant." 3 But the problem is not that too little effort
is spent on empirical work; indeed, if anything, the sociology of law
is probably over-concerned with "research," in the sense of a rather
abstracted accumulation of more and more "data." And there is no
lack of attention to the problem of "relevance"; both of these readers
contain several selections dealing with such potent issues as black
militancy and the Vietnam war. What is missing is not the desire to
illuminate important social issues, but the theoretical foundation that
could make real understanding possible.
A short piece by Richard Schwartz in the Schwartz and Skolnick
volume illustrates this failing 4 In the face of ghetto violence, writes
Schwartz, official and scholarly explanations have been less than satis-
factory; they have increased "in diversity, intensity, and futility." Law
itself has played an ambiguous role in the racial situation, sometimes
assisting, sometimes hindering the struggle for racial equality. Clearly
something more needs to be done, but Schwartz seems totally at a loss
as to what it might be. "Given the unsatisfactory nature of our present
handling of the problem .... " he writes, "we seem to need some
1. LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 915-16 (L. Friedman & S. Macaulay cds. 1959)
[hereinafter cited as FRIEDMAN].
2. Friedman and Macaulay tend, in particular, to structure their materials in terms
of these kinds of conceptual issues.
3. FREDM AN viii.
4. Schwartz, Law, Violence, and Civil Rights, in SocrY AND THE LEGAL ORDER 510-12(R. Schwartz & J. Skolnick eds. 1970) [the latter hereinafter cited as ScnIwAtrrz].
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alternatives. Perhaps the law can help if its functions and possible
techniques are more broadly considered than usual. At any rate, we
need to think of something."5
These remarks reflect a more general state of confusion and un-
certainty. Confronted with pervasive and deeply rooted social conflict,
the sociology of law-like much of academic social science-has tended
to throw up its hands, declare itself bankrupt of useful ideas, and
helplessly affirm the need "to think of something."
What is the source of this confusion? Is it that there is nothing in
the various traditions of social science that could contribute to a
better understanding of conflict and crisis in the society and in the
legal order? Or is it that students of law and society have, for whatever
reasons, failed to make full use of all that is available in social science?
I think the latter is true. The inability to deal with the current
crisis is one manifestation of a more general problem. The sociology
of law suffers because it has drawn to an excessive extent on those
social science traditions and methods that are least able to deal with
large scale social conflict, least able to provide a critical perspective
on contemporary institutions and their evolution, and least able to
generate alternative conceptions of law and legal institutions.
I
A glance at either of these collections confirms that, for the most
part, the sociology of law has been guided by only some of the major
traditions in social theory. In the introduction to Society and the
Legal Order, the editors, discussing formative influences on the so-
ciology of law, mention Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, and Maine. Marx
is conspicuously absent, not to mention Engels and Lenin. The Divi-
sion of Labor in Society6 is regarded as a classic in the field, yet The
Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State7 is not men-
tioned. Why is this? Why are Engels' insights of no use to serious
modern sociologists, while Durkheim's are?
Friedman and Macaulay's volume also lacks examples of classical
Marxian scholarship, although it includes an excerpt from a Stalinist
discussion of legal philosophy, a brief selection from C. Wright Mills'
The Power Elite, and a short radical leaflet from the Berkeley Free
5. Id. at 512.
6. E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SocIETY (2d ed. G. Simpson transl. 1933).
7. F. ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND TIE STATE (1912).
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Speech Movement. These are grouped in a general section dealing
with "The Impact of Public Opinion on Law," and are thoroughly
overwhelmed in the mass of material in the book." They are clearly
not presented as a serious alternative to the dominant model of law
and society underlying much of contemporary legal sociology.
This dominant model, although nowhere explicit, is a pluralist and
meliorist interpretation of American society and the American legal
system, intellectually rooted in classical bourgeois sociology and in
liberal jurisprudence. Within this model there is a fairly wide range
of issues and points of view, so that the sociology of law often appears
to encompass a bewildering variety of perspectives. But, in fact, the
prevailing discussion takes place within boundaries that are quite
limiting. Indeed, one of the most striking features of the sociology
of law today is the relative absence of real controversy. There are
innumerable research topics and themes of interest, but there are very
few important clashes over burning issues. Does this mean that law
is not the kind of subject that can inspire controversy? Hardly. I
think it means that most people who study legal institutions, whether
lawyers or social scientists, share so many common assumptions that
serious theoretical conflict is unlikely to occur.
What constitutes serious controversy is of course a matter of opinion.
The question is whether the disagreements expressed in the legal
sociological literature ever rise to a level at which they can provide
structure and focus for important research and thinking. An example
may help to illustrate what I have in mind. In the study of social
stratification, the issue of whether the traditional concept of social class
is still useful in the analysis of advanced industrial societies has pro-
vided a focus for much important research. But this focus has arisen
as a result of the clash of competing theoretical traditions.-Marxian
and liberal-one stressing the continuing centrality of class relations
in modem social life, the other stressing the increasing irrelevance of
economic factors and the blurring of class distinctions in the "post-
industrial" societies. Similar kinds of issues have not been confronted
in the sociology of law, not because such issues do not exist, but be-
cause the liberal-pluralist model of law and society has dominated
the field by default. Not only are there very few Marxian analyses
in the academic sociology of law, but the non-Marxian varieties of
8. Fsmim 575-89. There is also a selection from G. KoLxo, R.,OAms A .D Ricu-
LATION (1965) in FruI.%LN 458-62.
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"conflict" theory represented by Mills or Dahrendorf, for example, are
strikingly under-represented.0
This results in an under-emphasis on law as an instrument of
power and/or of class rule. It is not news, for example, that social
class enters importantly into the question of the uses to which legal
talent is put in the United States. Yet Professor Erwin 0. Smigel,
whose study of Wall Street lawyers is excerpted in Schwartz and
Skolnick,10 views this fact with amazing complacency. He concludes
that although Wall Street gets a disproportionate share of legal talent,
this should not bother us. The Wall Street lawyer's skillful and flexible
maintenance of the corporate status quo, he argues, helps "give our
society continuity," thus providing "the liberal with time and oppor-
tunity to seek change in a relatively stable society" and thwarting
"the revolutionary" because "the keepers of the status quo do not
allow the seeds of deep discontent to flower."" This degree of ac-
ceptance is unusual. But despite the fact that many sociologists of law
would recognize and perhaps deplore this general situation, there is
no attempt at a theory of law as an instrument of class domination
in contemporary capitalist society. Without such a theory, the tendency
is to drift into the assumption that these class biases are peripheral,
rather than central, to the American system of justice.
Another result of the failure of the more critical traditions in social
theory to penetrate legal sociology is that the values of the American
legal system tend to become the outer limits of analysis. Many of the
best studies in the sociology of law focus on the failure of some legal
agency to live up to the values which it supposedly serves.' 2 There
are good analyses of the ways in which bureaucratic pressures divert
the police from democratic law enforcement, of the social processes
that inhibit the goal of rehabilitation in prisons, and so on.' 3 But we
have few studies that look more critically at the goals of "democratic"
policing or rehabilitation themselves, within the American social con-
text of class, racial, and sexual subordination. This does not mean,
of course, that sociologists of law are uncritical of abuses and ine-
9. C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956); R. DAHRENDORF, CLASS AND CLASS
CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1959).
10. Smigel, Realities and Possibilities, in Sciiw.ATz 269-70.
11. Id. at 270.
12. See A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1967); L. MAYHEW, LAW AND EQUAL Ors'OR-
TUNITY (1968); Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a
Public Defender's Office, 12 Social Problems 255 (1965), excerpted in SCIWAnITZ 889-419.
13. See J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); G. SYKES, T, E Socirry OF CAP-
TIVES (1958).
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qualities within the legal system. It does mean that these phenomena
are usually studied and criticized as deviations from legal values that
are not themselves considered problematic. Yet American law is largely
the product of a world-view and a social system whose overall viability
and integrity can no longer be taken for granted.
II
In the absence of opposing perspectives, much work in the sociology
of law is guided and shaped by the dominant model in almost uncon-
scious ways. Consider a study of the rise and decline of the "fellow-
servant rule" in industry-Social Change and the Law of Indtmlrial
Accidents by Ladinsky and Friedman. 14 The authors conclude that
their analysis "utilizes and supports a view of social change as a com-
plex chain of group bargains." They claim to have shown that in the
"struggle over industrial accident legislation" no single group domi-
nated in the sense of having won a "total victory." Indeed, while
"[t]heoretically... total victory by one competing interest and total
defeat of another is possible . . . in a functioning democratic society,
total victories and defeats are uncommon."15 The implication is not
only that the decline of the "fellow-servant rule" and the rise of work-
men's compensation represented such a pluralistic bargaining process,
but that the United States, on the basis of this and other evidence, is
"a functioning democratic society."
Does the empirical evidence presented by Ladinsky and Friedman
support these contentions? A close reading suggests otherwise. Their
own evidence, in fact, indicates quite strongly that it was in the in-
terest of the business community to promote workmen's compensation
laws, and that without the recognition of that interest on the part of
business the laws would not have come into existence. This does not
necessarily mean that workmen's compensation was a "total victory"
for business, but neither does it suggest a process of bargaining and
compromise among competing social interests. What it most clearly
suggests is that in capitalist society business holds what amounts to
a veto power over legal change. In this case, as Ladinsky and Friedman
point out, business discovered that direct compensation to injured
employees was less cumbersome and not significantly more costly than
14. Friedman & Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, in
FRiE mAN 525-45. For a different interpretation of these issues, see particularly J.
WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STArE: 1900-1918 (1958).
15. FimxmA. 543.
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having to litigate over and over again individual cases. Business
therefore supported workmen's compensation in the interest of ra-
tionalization and predictability.' 0 Nowhere is it suggested that labor
(or anyone else) possessed a similar power over the adoption or
rejection of social reform measures. Fitting this analysis into the
"bargaining" model of social change seems a rather Procrustean exer-
cise. The theory seems tacked on to the data, an article of faith more
than anything else.
Something similar happens in Robert Dahl's analysis of the Supreme
Court's role in the American political system. 17 Dahl assembles em-
pirical evidence suggesting that the Court most often operates within
the policy framework provided by the dominant political alliance in
the United States at the time. Dahl argues, moreover, that it is "some-
what unrealistic to suppose that a Court whose members are recruited
in the fashion of Supreme Court justices would long hold to norms
of Right or Justice substantially at odds with the rest of the political
elite."' 8 He notes further that where the Court has gone against the
dominant alliance, it has often done so "to preserve the rights and
liberties of a relatively privileged group at the expense of the rights
and liberties of a submerged group: chiefly slaveholders at the expense
of slaves, white people at the expense of colored people, and property
holders at the expense of wage earners and other groups."' 0 In other
instances of apparent disagreement, the Court and the dominant law-
makers "were not very far apart" and, in any event, "it is doubtful
that the fundamental conditions of liberty in this country have been
altered by more than a hair's breadth as a result of these decisions."' 20
In his conclusion, however, Dahl tells us that the Court, despite its
somewhat blemished record, must be understood as an institution
which "operates to confer legitimacy, not simply on the particular and
parochial policies of the dominant political alliance, but upon the
basic patterns of behavior required for the operation of a democra-
cy." 2' Somehow, after all that rather disturbing evidence, the Court
comes out, so to speak, smelling like a rose. So does the American
political system generally, which Dahl is careful to characterize as
that of a "stable democracy." 22
16. Id. at 535-37.
17. Dahl, The Supreme Court as a National Policy.Maker, in SCHwARTz 236.49.
18. Id. at 244-45.
19. Id. at 245.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 247.
22. Id. at 246.
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A discussion of judicial review by Alexander Bickel in the same
volume also celebrates the Court's democratic role.23 This time the
argument is not superimposed on a body of recalcitrant evidence. In-
stead, Bickel develops a theoretical argument in which he distinguishes
between the more immediate, practical effects of government actions
and their long-range impact on the more enduring principles and
values on which democracy rests. The Court often acts "undemocrat-
ically" in that its decisions may go against the immediate aims of
majorities, but the Court's longer-range function is to affirm the
legitimacy of basic legal values and institutions and to symbolize the
continuity and "moral unity" of American society; in this deeper
sense, it is in accord with democratic theory.24
This is all very well, but the entire discussion rests on an identifi-
cation of American legal values with democratic ones, and also on
the assumption that there is a "moral unity" in American society,
which presumably reflects a broad consensus on social and economic
issues. Neither of these crucial assumptions is discussed or defended
in Bickel's treatment. The entire social and economic context in
which the Court operates is simply taken for granted, and most of
the really interesting questions about the role of the courts in Ameri-
can society remain unasked.
Herbert Packer's discussion, Who Can Police the Police?,2 provides
another illustration of the influence of the dominant model. Packer
notes that the issue of what the police do and how they do it has
recently become increasingly important and "is given added poignance
by our discovery of the urban poor who, by an interesting coincidence,
turn out to be the principal objects of police attention."20 The Su-
preme Court's intervention into the control of police conduct, Packer
argues, has come about through the default of the more appropriate
avenues of legislation and/or internal efforts at control by the police
themselves. What, then, is the best approach to the control of the
police for those who are concerned with libertarian values?
"The most obvious and effective way," Packer writes, "is by chang-
ing the police: better education, better recruitment policies, better
pay."2 7 In the interim, new sanctioning devices ought to be created
23. Bickel, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, in ScitwArz 249.62. An anal)sis of
the role of the judiciary that deals with some of the issues Bickel leaves out may be
found in R. MIuLAND, THE STATE IN CAPITALIST SocIEry 138-45 (1969).
24. ScijA.Rrz 259-60.
25. Packer, Who Can Police the Police?, in ScnMvATz 463-74.
26. Id. at 464.
27. Id. at 473.
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-perhaps improved means for aggrieved individuals to bring suit
against police departments, perhaps better complaint and review pro-
cedures that might make the "internal processes of police discipline
more responsive to values other than efficiency in police terms."-"
It seems almost malevolent to carp at such worthwhile sentiments;
but when all is said and done, Packer's discussion amounts to little
more than a statement of good intentions. Most of us might agree that
we would prefer the police to abide by libertarian values, and we
might also agree that it would be nice if legislatures or police depart.
ments would take steps to insure that they did. But underlying Packer's
discussion is the apparent assumption that people like legislators and
police officials would behave in the way civil libertarians would like
them to behave, if only they saw the light. A consensual model of the
social order has been assumed, one in which the interests of apparently
opposed social groups-the powerful and the powerless, the well-off
and the poor-are seen as ultimately compatible.2
An analysis of the police that took its bearing from a theory more
sensitive to questions of class and power would begin differently. It
would probably ask at the outset why there are so few controls over
the behavior of the police in American society-why, for instance,
there are so many jurisdictions that simply have no rules at all gov-
erning the use of firearms by policemen. Such an analysis might start
with the suspicion that an uncontrolled police exists because it is in
someone's interest for it to exist. We know that it is mainly the poor
who suffer from arbitrary police action, but who gains? According to
the consensual model, no one gains, with the possible exception of
the cop on the street. Packer suggests, therefore, that even police
officials may be persuaded that "their present opposition to proposals
designed to pry open the para-military system of police discipline is
a case of a sinking ship firing on its rescuers." 30
But if no one of any importance really gains from the lack of control
over the police, why are there no reasonably effective sanctions against
police arbitrariness, and why have there never been any in this coun-
try? The problem, after all, is not a new one, as the most cursory
reading of American history makes clear. The specific focus of police
harassment and violence may have fluctuated somewhat over the
years, but it is safe to say that it has always been aimed in the same
28. Id.
29. Thus, Packer hopes that, in time, the poor may come to see the police as "[n]ot
friends, perhaps, but inhabitants of the same society." Id.
SO. Id. at 474.
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general direction-from the propertied to the poor, white to black,
top to bottom. Police rarely beat up Standard Oil executives, or even
slumlords. Can anyone think of instances when police violence has
been used on behalf of the poor?
All of this suggests that, though police behavior may often be arbi-
trary, it is not therefore accidental. The consensual model of policing,
in short, does not adequately consider the possibility that, in the words
of Eldridge Cleaver, the problem is not trigger-happy cops but a
trigger-happy social order.3' The consensual model underestimates the
stake that established interests may have in the police as armed en-
forcers of the status quo, and it therefore also underestimates the
resistance of those interests to any measures that might curtail the
effectiveness of the police as an instrument of control. The model
therefore cannot satisfactorily explain the absence of rules and sanc-
tions governing the police; it can only deplore the situation and issue
pleas for legislative intervention, bureaucratic self-restraint, and more
pleasant cops.
Ultimately, the "most obvious and effective way" to control the
police is not "by changing the police" but by changing the structures
of class and racial domination that the police now serve. If we were
talking about some other society-say, South Africa or Haiti or some
colonial regime-this would doubtless seem obvious. Yet liberal social
scientists seem strangely addicted to the notion that, in America, the
instruments of repression can be substantially changed (for the better)
without changing the oppressive conditions that have called them
forth. In colonial regimes, the police are controlled not through edu-
cation or even litigation, but by decolonization. Should it not be
asked whether something similar may be required in advanced capi-
talist societies?
III
Perhaps it is a little unfair to generalize about the whole subject
from only a few studies. But I think these examples do reflect some
of the most important presuppositions in the sociology of law: the
conception of law as the outcome of pluralistic competition among
various groups; the tendency to look at legal institutions in relative
isolation from the broader framework of domination and exploitation
within which they function; and the related, often implicit, conception
31. E. CA.EAvEn, Domestic Law and International Ordcr, in Sour ON ICE 134 (190IS).
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of American society as, if not exactly harmonious, at least capable of
resolving its conflicts without radical structural change.
These presuppositions, as the above discussion of the police suggests,
lend themselves to a meliorist approach to social policy that is rarely
questioned. Two main tendencies seem to dominate the policy side
of most work in the field. They are not, strictly speaking, mutually
exclusive, but there is a definite tension between them. One is the
tendency toward rationalization-the effort to make the various
agencies of the law more efficient, particularly those agencies most
strained under the conditions of contemporary society, such as the
police and the lower criminal courts.32 The second tendency empha-
sizes the need to humanize legal and social institutions generally,
especially those dealing with the poor: for example, prisons and the
welfare system. The aim is to build responsiveness and regard for
personal rights into these institutions, and where necessary, to conceive
and institutionalize new definitions of rights, as, for example, the
rights of welfare recipients to the "New Property."33
Both tendencies have been with us for some time. Both, I think,
are ultimately limited in their analysis of contemporary institutions
and in their vision of alternatives. One envisions only the strength-
ening of existing institutions without altering their character in the
least, despite substantial evidence that those institutions do not work
very well, even by the barest pragmatic standards. The other seeks
to modify the institutions in the direction of expanding their capacity
to promote and sustain the rights and personal dignity of their cli.
entele. Yet all of this presupposes the basic structural framework of
American society.
Consider, for example, the idea of securing the rights of the poor
vis-A-vis the official agencies that control so much of their lives.
"[What are the potential resources," it is asked, "within the existing
areas of law for promoting the interests and aspirations of the poor
and for insuring conformity of official action to the rule of law?"' t
Again, these are laudable aims. Yet there is a sense in which the very
language employed suggests a decision not to confront the larger
framework of social class and economic power that creates and main-
32. See, e.g., President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Administration of justice,
Task Force Report: The Courts, in SCHWARTZ 403-14. See also Note, The All.purpose
Parts in Queens Criminal Court: An Experiment in Trial Docket Administration, 80
YALE L.J. 1637 (1971).
33. See Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty; Carlin, Howard & Messinger, Poverly and
Legal Competence; Reich, The New Property, in SCHWARTZ 303-05, 591-95, 595-605.
34. Carlin, Howard & Messinger, supra note 33, at 593.
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tains poverty to begin with. The poor will get their advocates, but
they will still be the poor. They will be treated with more dignity
and with better chances of having at least some of their immediate
grievances resolved, but their poverty will remain an unfortunate but
inevitable fact of urban life.
In addition, this approach often fails to appreciate the strength and
significance of entrenched resistance to important reforms within the
legal system. The perils of legal services programs around the country
under the onslaught of conservative power should serve as an object
lesson in this respect. The fact that on a variety of levels the most
interesting reform efforts of the early sixties are being systematically
eroded is of great theoretical, as well as practical, interest for the
sociology of law. Its implication is, again, that more attention needs
to be paid to those theoretical traditions in social science that make
the phenomena of class and power central rather than peripheral.
In the area of social policy as well as of social analysis, then, the
sociology of law needs to become more critical in its premises and
farther-reaching in its proposals. As it is, most of our thinking about
ways of changing and humanizing legal institutions takes place within
the confines of the dominant political and economic ideologies in
the United States. But we need to think in terms not only of hu-
manizing the present institutional structure but of creating new kinds
of institutions and new levels of challenge to the social and economic
bases of class injustice. To do this intelligently would require a chal-
lenge to the dominant pluralist and consensual assumptions that,
however implicitly, guide the sociology of law at present.
The materials for such a challenge are available, in those traditions
of critical social theory that have been so thoroughly neglected. Marx,
in particular, has much to offer the sociology of law; so do Karl
Mannheim and C. Wright Mills, not to mention the host of newer
scholars-economists, sociologists, and historians, both in Europe and
in the United States-who are now doing important work on the
nature of modem capitalism as a social system. 35 It is not necessary to
be a partisan of this kind of analysis to recognize the intellectual pov-
erty of a social science that ignores it.
35. An introduction to these materials might begin with Marx's economic and philo-
sophical manuscripts of 1844 in E. FROMM, MAX'S CoNcaEr oF MN 85-196 (1963);
F. ENGELS, supra note 7; and Lenin, The State and Revolution, in TaiE ES ,,"AL LEvr
147-254 (Unwin edition 1961). (All are available in various editions.) More recent Marxian
thought may be approached through J. CAsirEmr, A,,roxio G.A.1.sci A.D TriE OmGis OF
ITALIAN COMMUNISM (1967). G. KoLo, THE Tum.jsi OF COxSERVATISM (1963) is an excel-
lent example of recent critical analysis of the American historical background. See also K.
MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPA (1936).
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IV
There is also a great need for serious comparative analysis. Perhaps
paradoxically, the inability of the sociology of law to make much
critical sense of what is going on in American society comes partly
from an over-concentration on studies of the American legal system.
Again, most areas of American social science have been weak on com-
parative and historical analysis, and the sociology of law is hardly
unique in this respect.
Both of these readers are remarkably short on comparative mate-
rials. Friedman and Macaulay, in fact, point out that not only is their
collection based almost wholly on American materials, but the selec-
tion has been strongly influenced by the concerns of the United States
in the 1960s.3 6
In practice, this reinforces the tendency to avoid framing questions
that could transcend the logic of the system that is being studied.
Without comparative materials, especially from other industrial so-
cieties with different political and economic bases, it is hard to con-
ceive of alternatives to the American system or of the possible social
roots of such alternatives. At the same time, in a kind of vicious circle,
the tendency to take the system and its values for granted reduces the
impulse to make the kind of comparative analysis that can shed critical
light on the problems of our own society. In academic social science
generally, comparative analysis is not often used as a means of dis.
covering possible alternatives to established institutions. At worst,
comparative work frequently becomes an excuse for self-congratula-
tion, as in the shallow comparisons often made in the recent past
between "democratic" Western societies and "totalitarian" socialist
countries. Even at best, comparative analysis often treats other so-
cieties' institutions as manifestations of an exotic culture rather than
as potentially alternate ways of arranging social life. In the sociology
of law there are a number of studies of Soviet law, for instance, and
a few of law in the People's Republic of China.3 7 But these are often
presented, at least implicitly, as examples of pathological deviations
from our own tried and tested institutions, not as alternative ways of
viewing and using law from which we might learn something. It may
be, of course, that there really is not much to be learned from the
36. FRIEDMAN Xi.
37. H. BERMAN, JUsTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. (1963); J. COHEN, TIlE CRIMINAL PRoCESS IN
THE PEOPLE'S REPULIc OF CHINA 1949-1963 (1968); Cohen, Chinese Mediation on thw
Eve of Modernization, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1201 (1966).
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legal experience of other societies; the conditions of their social de-
velopment may be too different from our own. But we won't know
this without a serious effort to find out. As it is, there is a lack of
even speculative concern with how things might be different, and this
is partly responsible for the perplexing sense of confusion and inertia
in the sociology of law at a time when our own system seems to be
working badly.
V
The great value of Marxian and other critical perspectives for the
sociology of law is that they make problematic precisely those aspects
of law and society that the dominant model assumes or ignores-es-
pecially the historically specific social and economic context in which
Western legal institutions function and which gives them their shape
and their direction. Issues could then be raised that are now obscured.
Many of these issues have to do with the limits and possibilities of
justice in capitalist society. What, for example, are the limits of ef-fective reform of legal agencies in a society that remains dominated
by private corporate enterprise? To what extent can a legal system
that is historically associated with the rise of an entrepreneurial class
be refashioned into an instrument of liberation for the propertyless
and powerless? What is the historical background of our contemporary
agencies of justice and the ideologies that underlie them? How does
this background relate to the more general development of class struc-
ture and ideology in the capitalist countries? What alternatives to the
present institutions of justice may be possible "within the system"?
Can something like community control of the police make a significant
difference in the impact of law on the poor, or is it more likely to
function as a new form of indirect rule?
A final issue has to do with the future of liberal (or "bourgeois-
democratic") legal values in the face of a deepening social and eco-
nomic crisis in American society. What historical precedents are there
for an authoritarian solution to the problems of capitalism under
stress? Some signs of such a crisis have already appeared. It would be
unfortunate if social science turned out to be completely unprepared
for the results.
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